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MINNESOTA LAW

REVIEW

ELECTION OF REMEDIES*

By Amos S.

DEINARD AND BENEDICT S. DEINARD
IN MINNESOTA

T

HE foregoing, we believe, are the only authentic cases of election between remedies." They stand as the only, isolated applications of the rule. In relation to them, this rule bears no
necessary kinship to the doctrines of election between properties,
or between substantive rights, which rest upon settled principles
of equitable jurisprudence and of the substantive law. Its acceptance could not support, nor its rejection endanger the validity
of those doctrines. As we shall later submit, those doctrines lend
*Continued from 6
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!Although no other cases have been found at law, there should be

mentioned a rule of bankruptcy administration which prevailed for some
time in England until abolished by statute in i869, except when" its obligations are all incurred in the same transaction. A creditor holding a joint
and several obligation or security of a partnership was not allowed to
prove against both the joint estate of the firm and the separate estate of
the partners, but was required to elect against which estate he would go.
The rule was established by Lord Talbot in Ex Parte Rowlandson, (1735)
3 P. Wins. 405. "His Lordship held, that as at law, when A and B are
bound jointly and severally to J. S. if J. S. sues A and B severally, he
cannot sue them jointly, and, on the contrary, if he sues them jointly, he
cannot sue them severally, but the one action may be pleaded in abatement of the other; so, by.the same reason, the petitioner in the present
case ought to be put to his election, under which of the two commissions
he would corme." This decision settled an arbitrary rule for double merdantile specialties as well, where it was confessedly in violation of the
rule of law. Lord Eldon in Ex Parte Bevan, (i8o4) 1o Ves. io6 (iog),
said: "The principle seems obvious; yet in bankruptcy for some reason,
not very intelligible, it has been said, the creditor shall not have the benefit of the caution he has used. I never could see, why a creditor, having
both a joint and a several security, should not go against both estates.
But it is settled, that he must elect." In Ex Parte Moult, (I832) Montague's Cases, 321 (337), Sir A. Pell said: "Does the rule correspond
with the law? It is admitted it does not. We are, therefore, called upon to
give our assent to an arbitrary doctrine, not founded on law or justice."
The rule must therefore be regarded as only an anomalous rule of
administration, with no satisfactory legal basis. It was repudiated in the
United States in In The Matter of Peter Farnum, (1843) 6 Boston Law
Rep. 21, Ames, Cases on Partnership 356, where Sprague J. said as to the
right of double proof: "This right, founded both in law and justice, I
do not think myself bound or authorized to set aside on account of an arbitrary rule, justly reprobated by the most eminent judges and jurists in
England, and never recognized in this country." For a citation of the
cases, see Ames, Cases on Partnership 348 N., 359 N. See Collyer,
Partnership (1832) 549-554, for the rule prior to its abrogation by statute
in England. See also Collyer, Partnership, 6th Ed. Wood's Notes, Sec.
032.
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only analogical argument for its validity.

But as an independent

rule, it would appear to be explicitlyand unqualifiedly accepted in
the decisions of the supreme court of Minnesota.
"The rule is as undoubted as it is familiar that, where a party

has inconsistent rights or remedies, he may claim or resort to one
or the other at his election, and that once made his election is irrevocable."'
"The doctrine of election of remedies is well settled in this
state and is to the effect following: where a party has a right to
choose one of two or more appropriate; but inconsistent, remedies
and with full knowledge of all the facts and his rights makes a
deliberate choice of one of them, he is bound by his election, and
is estoppedm from again electing and resorting to the other
remedy.""
These quotations are taken from the numerous dicta of the
court, and fairly express its avowed attitude. What the cases in
reality decide, it is our task to ascertain.
In Dunnell's Digest, under the title "Election of .Remedies,"
the subject matter is classified under the following heads: Definition; Distinguished from Estoppel; Necessity; Forms of Action
at Common Law; Finality of Election."0 Here are annotated
some twenty-five decisions of the Minnesota supreme court. In
the Supplement of 1916 seven cases are added." From 1916 to
date an equal number of cases is to be found similarly indexed
in the state reports. One would surely suppose that a rule of
such simple operation was now well settled. We shall endeavor
to analyze all the cases mentioned in terms of the previous discussion, to ascertain what the cases have precisely held, beyond the
stock generalities repeated as prefatory to most of them.
It is necessary as a preliminary -consideration to notice those
cases where the court has stated that the rule of election of remedies applied, but where in fact on analysis, the rule could not posinvolved.
sibly operate since no election of any sort was
The simplest case is that of submission to the power of a
court in spite of a jurisdictional defect, in order to be able to come
into courf and have the litigation decided on its merits. This
was the situation in Rheiner v. Union Depot,' after a railway
"Per Mitchell J., In re Van Norman, (1889) 41 Minn. 494, 43 N. W.
334 T The court uses "estopped" only in the non-technical sense of barred.
t
Aho v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., (i9o8) xo4 Minn. 322, i6 N. W.
59%1 Dunnell's Digest, sec. 2910-2914.
"Dunnell's Digest, Suppl. 1916, sec. 2910, 2914, 2914a.
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company had petitioned for condemnation of plaintiff's property.
The proceedings instituted on the petition were defective for lack
of jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff. Plaintiff, however,
appealed from the decision of condemnation,, and thereby discarded the objection he might have raised to the jurisdiction of
the tribunal. Later plaintiff brought action to restrain defendant from occupying his land. The court held that the remedy
sought was inconsistent with his former appeal, and that he was
thereby barred.
"At the time when plaintiff appealed from the award of the
Commissioner, two courses lay before him, either one of which
he might pursue. As yet, the proceedings having been without
jurisdiction as to himself, he might seek relief on that ground;
or, the jurisdictional defects being such that he might waive them,
he might disregard them and accept the award; or, if that was
deemed inadequate, appeal to the district court. Having chosen
the latter course, he is precluded by his own election from availing himself of the former. .

.

. The two remedies are incon-

sistent. Having made his election between them, and having
waived the defects for the purpose of securing what benefit he
might in a reassessment of his damages before the court and jury
on appeal, 'he is precluded thereby, and cannot now be allowed to
recall his waiver, and make again invalid what his own acquiescence had rendered valid."
It will be noted that-the court, rested its decision equally on a
waiver and an election. It is submitted that the case really depends on neither. Since the procedure of condemnation was defective, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff,
unless he consented and chose thereby to confer that jurisdiction
which the court hitherto lacked. When he consented and the
court acquired jurisdiction, plaintiff surrendered his defense on
that ground. Appeal to the district court was simply conclusive
as to his consent. He did not elect between his remedies, for he
had only one, and he surrendered that one by consenting to the
irregular proceeding. If by "waiver" the court meant only a failure to raise an available defense to the action, and by "election" a
determination so to "waive," the language of the opinion is
wholly inadequate and obscures the ratio decidendi of the case.
A case that is just as clearly distinguishable from cases involving an election of remedies is Wright v,. Robinson."

The court

had appointed B receiver of the property of A. C, a judgment
creditor of A, caused a levy to be made on a portion of the prop"(1883) 31 Minn. 289, 17 N. W. 623.
'(I9oo) 79 Minn. 272, 82 N. W. 632.
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erty in the hands of B. On motion of B, the court made an
order restraining C from levying, but providing for retention by
B, who was to sell the property, of sufficient money from the
sale to satisfy the execution, awaiting, any steps C might take to
protect his rights. C availed himself of this part of the order,
and sued B to recover the money. Later C appealed from -the
order. B was holding the money pending determination of the
suit against him. C's appeal was dismissed. The court based its
decision on the ground that:
"The creditor had an election of inconsistent remedies. It
could appeal, and thus have its rights determined as against the
receiver; or could do what it did do,--institute the action to determine whether or not it was entitled to the money. . . . It could
not do both..... As.soon as the choice was made, and one of
these alternative remedies proffered by the law, adopted, the act
operated as a final and absolute bar as regards the other."
The appellant here is presented as acting under an interlocutory order in receivership proceedings by taking advantage of
the rights secured to him by that order, and, pending action to
determine those rights, attempting also to appeal from the order.
The grounds of appeal are his right to levy upon and take immediate possession of the property, and the impropriety of remitting
him to further action against the avails of the sale. The court in
effect refuses to hear him as to the impropriety, for the reason
that he has already debarred himself by taking advantage of the
order. This refusal of the court is undoubtedly correct. There is
abundant authority for the principle that one who takes the benefits of a judicial order cannot at the same time appeal from it;
his conduct amounts to a release of errors, and he will not be
heard to say that it was unjust.' But the mere fact that a litigant in a court of justice will not be allowed to acquire advantages by assuming inconsistent positions, in no way argues that it
is a case for the application of the rule of election of remedies.
It is true that remedies, it is always said, must be held inconsistent in order to require election betveen them. But there must
always be the two remedies. The right of appeal is not a remedy
for the alleged wrong; the only remedy is that against the receiver; the repugnancy resides ii accepting and repudiating the
identical remedy; because of this repugnancy the litigant forfeits
his right to appeal by pursuing the remedy.
"Exhaustive note, 29 L. R. A. (N.S.) i.
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An unusual situation atise in Pederson v. Christofferson."
In that case, C, the natural daughter of the deceased, filed a petition in the probate court. The petition stated that the deceased
had left an estate, and a last will and testament. (as she was informed and believed), that she was the daughter of the deceased,
and a legatee under the will, and set out the names of the other
known heirs and legatees. The petition prayed that probate be
grantqd to her. The will was in the possession of the probate
court. On the day set, hearing was adjourned on application of
the other heirs, to ehable them to offer proof of the will and to
file objections to granting letters to C. On the adjourned day,
these heirs appeared in support of the will. C now fil--i objections to its allowance on the grounds of improper execution, lack
of testamentary capacity, and undue influence. The court admitted the will to probate; C took an appeal to the district court;
the heirs moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that C had
elected to take under the will, and was thereby barred from contesting it. The court found that the heirs were themselves estopped from raising the objection. The court thus avoided a decision as to whether in the absence of such estoppel of the heirs, C
would have barred herself from contesting -the will.
"Such being the case it is unnecessary to consider what the respective rights of the parties would have been if the proponents
had seasonably asserted- the claim that the contestant had elected
to have the will probated and is therefore estopped from contesting it."
But the court did not hesitate to say that the situation facing C
was one calling for an election of remedies.
"Briefly stated, the claim of the proponents is that the contestant was at liberty to institute proceedings for the probate of
the will or to contest it, but she could not do both, and, having
elected to institute proceedingsv for the probate of the will, she is
estopped from changing her position. This presents the question
of election of remedies, not an election under the will; for, if the
will be valid the contestant would, upon its being probated, take
as legatee although she may have contested the will."
It is submitted that this statement of the court is correct in
only one point, that it is not the case of an election under a will.
The doctrine of election under a will, as drawn probably from the
civil law,M applied in Scotland, and later introduced into equity,
'(x9o6) 97 Ainn. 49r, xo6 N. W. 958.
"i Sw. 396, 398; 2 Story, Equity Juris, sec. io78, ioSo ff.
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is limited to the case where a testator bequeaths property to A
and directs A in turn to give certain of his own property to B.
If A accepts the bequest he must surrender his property; if he
refuses to surrender he renounces the bequest. A must take his
choice: therein lies his.election.f That is all of the doctrine. Obviously it does not apply to the instant case.
Just as clearly there is no choice between substantive rights.
For it is admitted that if C is in fact named as legatee in the will,
she must be allowed to take whether she propounds or contests
it. Participation in the proceedings for probate is not relevant
to the question of her rights as legatee. What she demands, and
what the heirs deny her, is only a locus standi in court to take
part in the contest. The inherent vice in her assertion is that she
has previously taken a wholly inconsistent position in propounding the will. It may well be a the court intimates, though the
proposition is certainly doubtful, that C has forfeited her right
because of this inconsistency. Some support may be found in
the decision that a creditor acquiescing by any significant act in
a general assignment is debarred from attacking it. ' Still 'as in
the case of Wright v. Robinson," there was only one remedy available to C: the question at issue is whether that remedy remains
to her. There is no basis for any estoppel: C makes no representation by filing her petition; the heirs are neither misled nor
damaged by it. At worst, C has played various roles. The false
assumption that anything smacking of contradictory attitudes
'The earlier dicta on the point of forfeiture were later repudiated, and
the doctrine authoritatively declared as follows: that if A refuse to give
up the property, of which the testator had assumed to dispose, he did not
absolutely forfeit the bequest, but was only obliged to compensate B for
his disappointment, and equity would sequester the bequest for that purpose. But this rule of compensation applies only where the election is to
take against the will, not where the election is to take under it. See the
learned annotation to the case of Gretton v. Haward, (i818) I Sw. 4o9,
433; Ker v. Wauchope (i819) i Bli. f251, for Lord Eldon's statement
of the doctrine; Van Dyke's Appeal, (1869) 6o Pa. St. 481: but contra,
Sugden, Powers, 8th Ed. sec. 576. That where the legatee has no assignable interest in the property with which the testator professes to deal
there can be no election, see re Lord Chesham, (1886) 31 Ch. Div. 466, 54
L. T. i54, 55 L. J. Ch.. 401, per Chitty J. The English cases are fully
considered in Jarman, Wills, 6th English Ed., 531-557.
"Rapalee v. Stewart, (1863) 27 N. Y. 31o. Ace., that a creditor accepting under a general assignment as a valid trust for creditors cannot
afterwards petition the assignor into bankruptcy, by reason of the inconsistency, although if others petition the assignor into bankruptcy, he may
share in the estate, In Re Romanow, (1899) 92 Fed. 51o, Williston, Cases
in Bankruptcy 114.
"(1909) 79 Minn. 272, 82 N. W. 632.
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must be a case for the application of the rule of election of remedies forces the court to the laborious creation of a counter-estoppel of dubious validity---erecting one straw man to destroy another.
The rule of election of remedies, by definition, applies only
when remedies are inconsistent with each other. There are many
cases of alternative remedies for the same cause of action, which
are analogous and concurrent, and involve no inconsistency. Thus
-trespass, trover and replevin all proceed upon the ground of continued ownership in. the plaintiff, and may be brought for the
same wrong. And at common law either covenant or debt would
lie for breach of an agreement under seal. ' An action for malicious trespass in seizing plaintiff's goods under an execution against
a stranger is not inconsistent with a replevin suit to recover the
goods." The cases might be multiplied indefinitely. But when
action is once pursued to satisfaction in one form of action, the
plaintiff cannot avail himself of suit by any other remedy. For
satisfaction discharges the cause of action and operates as a bar.
The rule is the same where there are several defendants, even
when each remedy is available against one defendant alone. Thus
if the defendant against whom judgment has been recovered and
satisfied was one of joint tort-feasors, his associates are no longer
answerable. Where the parties are not equally responsible, as
in cases of insurance and guaranty, discharge of one by satisfaction also discharges the others. But where the party secondarily
liable has satisfied a judgment against him, the party primarily
liable is still answerable to him, on the familiar principles of subrogation.
In Carlson v. 11inneapolis Street Ry. Co.,'"a scavenger in the
employ of plaintiff was killed in a collision with defendant's
streetcar. The state Workmen's Compensation Act had added
to .the common law remedy (or actionable negligence in case of
injury, or under Lord Campbell's Act in case of death) a statutory remedy against the employer for compensation. Though the
court said that "if he elects to pursue the former remedy, he
vaives the latter," what is really meant is that he can be satisfied
only once, for the court quoted and approved the following statement:
"For a nonsuit on an action on account is no bar to ali action of debt,
Co."Crockett
Lit. 146. v. Miller, (19O1) 112 Fed. 729, 50 C. C. A. 447.
'(919) 143 Minn. 129, 173 N. W. 405.
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"It is conceded, as the fact is, that, in case of an employee, in
the course of his employment, being injured by the actionable
negligence of a third person, a statutory remedy accrues to him
for compensation, against his employer and a common law
remedy against such third person though he can (not) have but
one satisfaction."'
Just as the plaintiff will not be allowed to harass the defendant on a cause of action which has been discharged by satisfaction, so by the operation of the rule of res adjudicata, he will
not be permitted to sue in an action when the issues involved have
been fully tried and decided against him in a prior suit. The entire doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment depends upon adherence to this salutary rule. If B thinks he has a cause of action
against A for the wrongful taking of his chattel he may declare
in assumpsit or in trover. If he sues in trover, and on the trial
it appears that the chattel in fact belonged to A, and judgment is
thereupon given for A, B can never make use of his alternative
action in assumpsit. But this is not because the rule of election of
remedies operates against him, but because in one action it has
appeared that he could have no rights in any action. The issue
in suit is res adjudicata.
Nothing more is necessary to understand the case of Thomas
z. Joslin," constantly cited as a leading case for the rule of election of remedies. Plaintiff in a former action had sued for specific performance of a land contract, but had been defeated on
the merits. The issuable fact was the authority of the defendant's agent, who had contracted with the plaintiff. In form the
contract was to convey the land free and clear; in fact, the court
had found that to the plaintiff's knowledge, and necessarily therefore as part of the agreement, the contract was to be subject to a
prior lease. Now, in an action to reform the contract (into a
contract to convey free and clear) and to enforce it as reformed,
defendant plead the former judgment as a bar. The court upheld the plea. The substance of the controversy was the extent
of the authority of the defendant's agent. Since the first case
was allowed to go to trial on the merits, the evidence disclosed that
the agent's authority was inadequate to make the kind of contract that plaintiff needed to establish. Therefore the matter was
"McGarvey v. Independent Oil & Grease Co., (914)

N. W. 895.

"(1886) 36 Minn.

I, 29

N. W. 344,

I

156 Wis. 58o, 146

A. S. R. 624 and N. 626.
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res adjudicata. For the new issue, though different in form, was
merely incidental to the identical right.
"Plaintiff elected to bring his action upon the contract in its
imperfect form and proceeded to trial and judgment thereon.
There was, however, in fact but one contract between the parties,
and but one claim or right upon which to base a recovery, though
it may not have been fully evidenced by the writing. This claim
has once been litigated, and, as defendants contend, finally."
Th court, however, intimated, though it did not expressly say,
that the matter was also one for the rule of election of remedies.
"We are unable to see, however, why the matter should not be
held to be res adjudicata, and the plaintiff bound by his election."
In a later case, counsel relied upon this intimation to contest an
action to reform a policy of insurance and recover upon it as reformed,' on the ground that plaintiffs had previously commenced
an action to recover upon the policy, though they had taken a dismissal without prejudice and before submission on the merits.
The court in considering the plea stated:
"The doctrine of election as between inconsistent remedies is
relied upon. . . If such were the case, the proper remedy having
been misconceived merely by reason of the failure of the plaintiffs
to correctly apprehend the legal construction of the written instrument . . . and that action having been dismissed without determination on the merits, the plaintiffs were not precluded from
maintaining this action. In Thomas v. Joslin, the former action
had proceeded to a judgment for the defendant on the merits."
The court therefore denied the plea. There had been no
determination of the issues in the previous action; the remedies
were not inconsistent; there was no reason why the plaintiff
should be concluded in his legal rights.
'Spurr v. Horne Ins. Co., (i889) 40 Minn. 424,

42

N. W. 2o6. In

Eder v. Fink, (192o) 147 Minn. 438, i8o N. W. 542, the court reviewed the

two cases. It held that a judgment for defendant in an action to charge
him as indorser barred further action for reformation of the indorsement.
"He elected to pursue the former course.

. . .

He is bound by an election

made under such circumstances."
A simple example of the application of the rule of res adjudicata,
mis-cited as a case of election of remedies, is the case of Middlestadt v.
City of Minneapolis, (1920)' 147 Minn. i86, 179 N. W. 89o. An attorney
has a statutory lien for his services, and if the parties settle before trial,
he may enforce his lien either by intervening in the original action, or by
bringing an independent action against the defendant. Where an attorney so intervened, and on motion it was found that he had surrendered his lien, he could not thereafter resort to an independent action. For
authority in a somewhat similar situation see Leigh v. Laughlin, (i9o6)
i3o 111. App. 530, where plaintiff was not allowed to resort to replevin
of the fee bill after the question has been determined against him on
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Summary. The six cases we have so far considered are regarded as the most authoritative statements of the rule of election
of remedies in Minnesota. We have seen on analysis, however,
that none of them involved a true election of any sort, and are
easily disposable on accepted principles. We shall next consider
another group of cases where an election actually operated, in
order to determine whether in the light of our preliminary discussion such election is properly referable to the substantive or
to the adjective law.
In Kraus v. Thompson,," plaintiffs had sold furniture, and
recovered judgment by confession for the purchase price. Later,
when they discovered that a fraud had been perpetrated on them,
they rescinded the sale. In an action to recover the property, the
trial judge excluded all evidence of rescission, charging the jury
that rescission was impossible after judgment for the purchase
price had been entered. The appeal presented the question of the
correctness of the charge.
The case clearly involved an election between substantive
rights. That the vendor had once elected to regard the sale as
in force was admitted. The controversy was as to its conclusiveness. Judge Mitchell stated the issue as follows:
"Does the foct that a vendor of goods, in ignorance of fraud
on the part of his vendee sufficient to authorize a rescission of
the sale, has obtained -judgment against his vendee for the purchase price of the goods,-amount to an affirmance or ratification of
the contract of sale, so as to preclude him from subsequently rescinding, upon discovery of the fraud?"
The court rightly held that it did not.
"Any act of ratification of the contract, after knowledge of
the facts authorizing rescission, amounts to an affirmance and terminates the right to rescind; but, if done before such knowledge,
it will have no such effect. And, in our opinion, the act of obtaining judgment against the vendee for the purchase price stands
in that respect on the same footing as any other act recognizing
the existence of the contract of sale and must be governed by the
same rules."
The point of interest for us in the case is the last remark of
the court, that the exercise of a remedial right here was of consequence only as the equivalent of any extra-judicial act of affirmance, and had no other elective operation. With the problem of
motion to retax costs. As to what matters are concluded by judgment
see Southworth v. Rosendahl, (1916) 133 Minn. 447, i58 N. W. 717.
"(1882) 30 Minn. 64. 14 N. W. 266.
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election in ignorance of substantive rights, this inquiry is not
concerned.
Raymnond v. Kah-d' was an action of replevin by a conditional
vendor to recover machinery sold. It suffices to quote from the
decision:
"Itis thoroughly well settled in this state, that after retaking
or recovering the property under a contract of this kind for a default of the buyer, the seller cannot thereafter maintain an action
to recover a balance due on the purchase price, or on notes given
therefor. The seller has the election (1) to reclaim the property;
(2) to treat the sale as absolute and sue to recover the debt; (3) to
bring an action to foreclose his lien. But the assertion of either
right is the abandonment of the other."
A somewhat different application of the same doctrines of
substantive election was involved in Bauer v. O'Brien Land Co.The defrauded party in an exchange of farms sued for rescission
and restitution. He had upon discovering the fraud offered to
rescind, and had tendered a reconveyance of the land deeded to
him;. but his offer had been spurned. The defense was predicated
on the contention that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law
for damages, and should be remitted to it. The court answered
the contention in this way:
"It is true that, where a defrauded party has rescinded by his
own act, he may sue at law and recover his damages to the value of
what he parted with. But that does not mean that, where his offer
of rescission had been spurned, he may not pursue his remedy in
equity. His unaccepted tender of rescission did not destroy the
equitable remedy."
Defiel v. Rosenberg" contains only a further discussion of
the rights of substantive election of a person induced to enter
into a contract by fraud, upon discovery of the fraud, where the
contract has been fully executed, remains wholly executory, or has
been only partially performed.
Hoidale v. Cooley' is a case of ratification. McGinnis, an
insurance agent, delivered life insurance policies to the defendant.
*His instructions had been to deliver them only on receipt of the
first premium in cash; but he disobeyed instructions and took two
notes of defendant indorsed in blank.

ferred them to plaintiff.

Plaintiff sued on the notes.

124 Minn. 426, 145 N. NV. 164.
"(i919) 144 Minn. 130, Y74 N. W. 736.
"(i919) i44 Minn. 166, i74 N. W. 838.
c(1919) 143 Minn. 430, 74 N. W. 413.
'(1914)

After maturity he trans-

The in-
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surance company intervened, claiming the notes. The court indicated intervenor's rights in the situation as follows:
"When intervenor learned that McGinnis had disobeyed instructions, and had delivered the policies, and taken the notes, three
courses were open to it: first, it might repudiate his act and demand a return of the policies. It did not do this. It chose to
have the policies in force. Second, it might charge McGinnis with
its proportion of the premiums, in which event the notes would
belong to McGinnis. [The court found it did not do this.] .
Third, it might ratify McGinnis' unauthorized act in taking the
notes and demand delivery of the notes to it. This, the court
found, intervenor did do."
The election was of a course of action to determine its substantive rights.
In Johnson v. John.son the defendant, a tenant at will, held
over after notice of termination of the lease; the landlord then
recovered possession by action under the forcible entry aid detainer statute. Later he brought action to recover rent for the
period of occupancy after notice of termination. His claim depended on the existence of the conventional relation of landlord
and tenant. The court found that the plaintiff had elected to
treat the defendant as a trespasser, and not as a tenant.
"We are of the opinion that, when a landlord has the right of
election, and may treat the tenant as a trespasser or as a tenant
holding over, the exercise of that right is conclusive against him,
and that thereafter he cannot impose new terms upon the tenant
without his consent."
The conduct of the plaintiff was thus correctly treated as an election between his substantive rights of continuation or termination
of contractual relations. Sifice the tenancy was at will, the plaintiff had at any time the right to terminate it or allow it to continue;
but once he had chosen the former course, there was only one
remedy open to him-to have his tenant ejected. Therefore, it
became impossible for him to sue for rent without proof of subsequent acceptance of a new tenancy on defendant's part. There
is no confusion here of the rule of election of remedies.
Assuming for the sake of hypothesis that a situation does
exist where the substantive rights of a litigant are determined,
and several remedies are available to enforce the same right on the
same state of facts, it has always been repeated that the rule of
election of remedies can have no operation unless the available
.. (1895) 62 Minn., 302, 64 N. W. 9o5.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

remedies are mutually inconsistent. If the remedies are not inconsistent, but are alternative and complementary, or otherwise
so reconcilable that the law will not regard the assumption of one
"'position" as a repudiation of the others, then the situation does
not warrant invoking the rule. As may be noticed, there is implied
here an illicit translation of the problem from terms of remedial
rights, which might appear inherently inconsistent, into terms of
"positions" assumed in order to maintain such rights. This is
traceable to the doctrine of "theories and action" underlying the
plaintiff's case, which the courts read into the general provisions
of the code abolishing forms of action and providing for one civil
suit. How far this doctrine has in fact perpetuated the old distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and between
actions in tort and in contract will be discussed at a later point.
The first case in Minnesota which raised the question whether
the remedies available were to be regarded as so inconsistent as to
require application of the rule of election of remedies was that of
Barnes v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co.1" In that case a property owner
sued insurance company "A" for the amount of a policy of fire insurance on a loss covered by it. For defense, company "A" alleged that, after the date of the policy, insurance company "B" had
reinsured the property, and had agreed with plaintiff and company
"A" that it would pay plaintiff any loss she might suffer under the
policy; that thereafter, but before this suit, company "B" had become insolvent and assigned for creditors under the state Insolvent Law, and that plaintiff had filed and proved her claim in the
insolvency proceeding against it for payment. Plaintiff demurred
to the defense, and the trial court sustained the demurrer. On
appeal the order was affirmed. The court held that, by proceeding against the estate of company "B," plaintiff did not relinquish
her remedy against company "A" upon the policy in suit. In answer to defendant's assertion that "by electing to proceed against
the estate of the German Insurance Co. (B) the plaintiff has
effectually waived her remedy against the defendant," the court
said:
"A creditor is put to an election only where his remedies are
inconsistent, and not where they are consistent and concurrent. In
the latter case, a party may prosecute as maniy as he has, as in the
case of several debtors. And so, if, in this instance, the remedy
against the insolvent company as respects the plaintiff, was merely
" (i893) 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W. 314.
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cumulative, there is no reason why she may not -pursue either or
both."
Of course, the plaintiff could have but one satisfaction, and in
case of concurrent actions, the court might interpose a stay if
necessary to protect the defendants' rights.
Bell v. Mendenhall1' is a similar case. A trust company
assumed and covenanted to pay the debts of certain grantors of
real estate in consideration of the grant. The creditors of the
grantor brought suit on the covenant. The trust company defended on the ground that a prior judgment against the grantors
had released it from its obligation. Execution on that judgment
had been returned wholly unsatisfied. The court held that the
trust company had become the principal debtor, and could be sued
on its promise to pay the claims. The prior action against the
grantors in no way prejudiced its rights.
"Its original and separate promise to pay the debt remained
intact until the plaintiff obtains satisfaction of the debt. . . The
plaintiff may maintain a separate action upon each promise at the
same or different times, for such remedies are consistent and concurrent."
From the definition of election it is also necessarily implied
that two remedies must in fact coexist. Otherwise, choice is impossible. This necessity seems to be recognized in all the cases
applying the rule of election of remedies. If by mistake of fact
or law plaintiff pursues a remedy that is really not available to
him, his rights cannot be concluded or prejudiced by such suit. '
We shall now consider the cases decided upon that point. It will
not be necessary to point out which are substantive elections and
which elections of remedies, since this necessity must exist for
elections generically.
The leading case in Minnesota is In re Van Norman." Plaintiffs levied an attachment on the property of their debtors, the
defendants. On the same day defendants executed an assignment
of all their property under the state insolvent law for the benefit
of creditors. Plaintiffs, contesting the validity of the assignment,
refused to surrender the attached property to the assignee, but issued execution and sold the property to satisfy their judgment.
The assignees then brought action for the value of the property,
71 'Alinn. 331, 73 N. W. io86.
'0 Fuller-Warren Co. v.. Harter, (igoi) iio Wis. 80, 85 N. W. 698, 84
1203(1898)

L. R. A. 6o3.
A. S."s(1889)
R. 867,4153Afinn.
494, 43 N. W. 334.
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and recovered judgment. Plaintiffs paid the judgment in full.
Later plaintiffs presented their claim to~issignee for allowance. The
assignee disallowed the claim. It was held on appeal that plaintiffs
were not debarred, but might present their claim for allowance and
share in the benefits of the assignment. Judge Mitchell said:
"If appellants are debarred, it must be on the ground that they
had elected to pursue an inconsistent remedy, or to claim an inconsistent right. . . But it seems to us that the doctrine of election
between inconsistent rights or remedies has no application to the
facts of this case. The appellants never in fact had any election
of rights or remedies. Their action was a mere futile attempt to
assert a right which they never possessed, in which they were defeated. "A mere attempt to pursue a remedy or claim a right to
which a party is not entitled, and without obtaining any legal satisfaction therefrorri, will not deprive him of the benefit of that
which he had originally a right to resort to or claim; this proposition if sound, fully covers the case."
The cases following In re Vdn Norinan will be found in the
note' " The principle underlying them was well summarized in
the latest of them. In Kremer v. Lewis, ° plaintiff bought property on fraudulent inducements by defendant. The court said:
"These principles are well settled: One who has been induced
to enter into a contract by the fraud of the other party, has the
"'Marshall v. Gilman, (1892) 52 Minn. 88, 53 N. W. 811; Cumbey v.
Ueland, (1898) 72 Minn. 453, 75 N. W. 727; Schrepfer v. Rockford Ins.
Co., (1899) 77 Minn. 291, 79 N. XV. ioo5 (Under Minnesota standard
policy of insurance against loss by fire, insured sued without entering into
reference to arbitration, which was condition precedent to suit; was defeated; then offered to submit to reference, when Company in return refused; now insured sues again, Held, she might recover). See Christianson v. Norwich etc. Soc, (igoi) 84 Minn. 526, 88 N. W. 16. Also Virtue
v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. (1913) 123 Minn. 17, 142 N. W. 930, 136
L. R. A I915 B. 1179; Mohler v. Chamber of Commerce, (1915)- 130
Minn. 288, 153 N. X. 617 (A sold and delivered wheat to B who resold
to C. B could not pay; A sued C, but was defeated, since court found
title had passed. Now A wishes to enforce his right to a lien for the
debt on B's membership, according to the bylaws of the Chamber; lien
allowed); Preston v. Cloquet Tie & Post Co., (1911)

114 Minn. 398, 131

N. W. 474, (conversion of timber) Freeman v. Fehr. (x916) 132 Minn.
384, 157 N. W. 587; Gunderson v. Halvorson, (1918) 140 Minn. 292, 168
N. W. 8 (unsuccessful suit for rescission by vendee under executory contract for sale of land. "The result is not a bar to a recovery for damages
for the fraud if any was committed by the defendant. It will be within
the discretion of the court below, after the cause has been remanded to
grant an amendment of the complaint and to permit the action to proceed
as one for damages for the alleged fraud." Also Piper v. Sawyer, (1899)
78 Minn. 221, 8o N. W. 97o. Aho v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., (i9o8)
1O4 Minn- 322, 116 N. XV. 59o, could have been rested on even a simpler

basis, for the plaintiff sues in the case before the court in a quite different capacity than in the prior suit, and clearly could not be barred qua
administratrix by a prior mistaken action qua beneficiary.
"'(1917) 137 Minn. 368, 163 N_ NV. 732.
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choice of two remedies: He may stand on the contract, sue for
damages in an action for deceit, or he may rescind the contract
and recover what he has parted with. He cannot do both. A
choice of one remedy is an abandonment of the other. The commencement of an action. for rescission which fails, is no election,
for, to constitute an election, there must be a real choice, that is,
two courses must be really open to him, and from the fact that
he has in some manner lost the right of rescission, it does not follow that his right to damages does not exist. . . Defendants can
hardly contend now that the complaint [prior action in deceit] did
state a cause of action. With this state of facts, we think the
commencement of an action for damages on a complaint which
stated no cause of action could not destroy the right of action to
recover the purchase price paid which had already accrued to plaintiff by reason of a fully consummated rescission, and we find no
authority for any such rule of law."
CRITIQUE OF THE RULE

Sumvziary. The foregoing cases exhaust the list of cases decided under or cited in support of the supposed rule of election of
remedies. However, as we have seen most of them are cases in
which the matter has been discussed only for the purpose of
eliminating it as a point raised in argument, on grounds equally
valid in election of any type, namely, ignorance or mistake of fact
or of rights, want of jurisdiction of the previous suit, premature
action in the previous suit, etc. And those cases, which really
hold the suitor concluded by his prior action are apparently, in
the light of our discussion, cases of election between substantive
rights, where the remedies could be spoken of as inconsistent only
in the loose sense that they involved an unequivocal assertion of
inconsistent rights. In general, actions which proceed on the
theory that title to property is in the plaintiff are inconsistent with
those which consider title as in the defendant. Actions based on
the theory of affirmance of a contract are inconsistent with actions based on the theory of disaffirmance or rescission. Actions
based on the theory that plaintiff has ratified an unauthorized
transaction are inconsistent with actions based on the theory that
plaintiff had repudiated the same transaction. But beyond these
cases, all disposable on settled principles of substantive law without the necessity of adversion to any rule of election of remedies,
there is not even a mention of the two authentic cases where in
other jurisdictions it has been held that an election of one remedy,
after rights were determined, concluded the suitor. Granted that
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a plaintiff may "waive" his tort and sue in assumpsit, there is not
even a dictum that either suit would bar the other. How this
curious situation. could have arisen, namely, constant reference to
the rule in cases where it would be wholly inapplicable, without
any reference to the two authentic instances of its operation, can
be understood only in the light of the history and growth of implied assumpsit as a remedy for conversion,' and of the origin of
,the rule of election of remedies ii reference to it.
In 1676,' it was first held. that assumpsit would lie for the
proceeds of a conversion. .This remedy was added to the older
writs of trover, trespass, and replevin, in order to facilitate redress.
"The fiction of a promise invoked inthe cases . . . was originally
adopted simply for the purpose of pleading; the action of assumpsit which is in form and originally always was in fact, based on
a promise, being the only remedy open to the plaintiff seeking to
enforce a quasi-contractual obligationj and that the real ground of
liability is the fact that it would be unjust if the defendant were
not compelled, at the option of the plaintiff, to pay for value received. If such is the case, then the use of the fiction should
cease with the necessity which gave rise to it; and when used it
should be recognized as a fiction, and treated as a fact only for
the purpose for which it was invented."' "
But the English judges did not regard it in this way. In Lamiie
v. Dorrell,"' in which the right to waive a tort and sue upon promises was first distinctly recognized, Powell J. said:
"It, is clear the plaintiff might have maintained detinue or
trover for the indentures, but the plaintiff may dispense with the
wrong, and suppose the sale made by his consent, and bring an
action for the money that they were sold for as money received
to his use."
In this way the nature of the transaction was recast by a fiction of law in order to conform to the conventional allegations of
an assumpsit. The fact that the property was tortiously taken
from the plaintiff and was irrevocably lost to him, that he was suing only for damages, and that the form of his declaration could
not make what was before tortious cease to be so, were all overlooked in the fanciful idea that the transaction was really one of
sale, and that the form of action could thereby unequivocally determine affirmance or disaffirmance and change the substantive
"Phillips v. Thompson, 3 Lev.
'"Keener, Quasi-Contracts 2I1.
'"(1705) Ld. Raym. 1216.

191.
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rights of the parties."' The apparent distinction between rights
and remedies was entirely forgotten.
"Had not this almost self-evident proposition been lost sight
of, because of the fiction of a promise involved in the action of
indebitatus assumpsit when brought to enforce a right of action
not resting on contract, much of the confusion in and conflict of
decisions now existing would have been avoided.""
For instance in Lonugchamp v. Kennedy," an action in assumpsit for the value of a ticket which the defendant- refused to deliver
to the owner, Lord Mansfield said:
"If the defendant sold the ticket and received the value of it,
it was for the plaintiff's use, because the ticket was his. -Now,
as the defendant has not produced the ticket ,it is a fair presumption that he has sold it."
How conscientiously the common law judges regarded this
fiction of the sale can only be understood by considering the technique that grew up in cases of conversion in determining the right
to waive a tort and sue for the proceeds."' Originally the right
was confined to cases where the wrongdoer had resold the chattel.
"Nevertheless, the value of the goods consumed was never
recoverable in- indebitatus assumpsit. There was a certain plausibility in the fiction by which money acquired as the fruit of misconduct was treated as money received to the use of the party
wronged. But the difference between a sale and a tort was too
radical to permit the use of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered
where the defendant had wrongfully consumed the plaintiff's
chattels.""5
And today we find such statements as these:
"The bringing of the suit is nothing more than a ratification
of the sale made by the wrongdoer, and the converting of him
into the agent of the actual owner,""' in the face of the settled
prohibition in the law of principal and agent against ratification
of an undisclosed agency, and in clear contradiction to the parties'
intent. Later, in the 'United States, application of the right of
waiver was extended to cases where the wrongdoer put the chattels to his own beneficial use. Some states extend the right to
"waive" to every case of conversion."' In general, recovery is
"'13 Alb. L. J. 141-143 (Judge T. M. Cooley).
"Keener, Quasi-Contracts i6o.
"'(1~779) 1 Doug. 137.
Alb. L. J. 141.
W13

..Ames, Lectures Legal History 165.
"23 Cent. L. J. 534.
"l:Theconflicting authorities are collected in i9Yale L. J. 221 (A. L.
Corbin) ; 23 Cent. L. J.532, 556; 7 Encyc. P1. and Pr. 368 ff ; Bliss, Code
Pleading, 2nd Ed.. sec. 13
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limited to the amount of the defendant's enrichment, not the value
of the chattel. If the defendant has sold the property for immoral or illegal purpose, the owner cannot "waive" and recover
the price, on the absurd theory that he would thereby participate in
the illegality. Generally, the remedies of trover, trespass and
replevin proceed on the same theory of continued title in the, injured party. Therefore the analysis of "waiver" of action in
trover applies as well to an action in trespass for damages, or replevin for the property in specie or satisfaction in damages.
It should be understood that any criticism of the fictional ratification of a conversion does not apply to cases of ratification of
acts purported to be done on behalf of the party ratifying. In
such case the bar is a result of a substantive election.
The enforcement of the rule in the case of an unjust enrichment of one of two cotenants, which we considered, is even more
strained for the reason that both the actions available are founded
on wholly fictitious allegations. In Munroe v. Luke,... Shaw, C.
J. said of the artificial dilemma created by law:
"We think it arises out of the artificial rules and technical
principles, upon which actions of ejectment and real actions at
law proceed. To prosecute an action on contract, for rents and
profits, whilst the plaintiff has treated the defendant as a wrongdoer would, as said by Mr. Justice Ashhurst, in Birch v. Wright,
1 T. R. 379, 'be'blowing both hot and cold at the same time, by
treating the possession of the defendant as that of a trespasser,
and that of a lawful tenant, during the same period.' The difficulty, therefore is a technical one."
In the action in assumpsit the defendant, though treated as a bailiff, is not a bailiff in fact but is a converter; in the action in ejectment, by the consent rule, the defendant admits ouster and disseisin of the plaintiff by the causual ejector, though in fact the
allegations are understood to be wholly fictitious. Nevertheless,
after suit in ejectment the plaintiff cannot allege seisin to give
him title to claim rents and profits on a supposed contract.
That the new remedy of assumpsit was founded on a fictional
transaction could not be objectionable as long as its only effect
was to give an additional remedy said to be founded on a
"waiver." There was no necessity for predicating the existence
of the contract between the plaintiff and defendant any farther
than was necessary to allow the writ to be framed in the language
of assumpsit. That the existence of the contract would persevere
'.(i84o) i Met. 459.
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to defeat the plaintiff in a later action of tort is a further development. Until the suit in assumpsit was held to involve a position
so inconsistent that its assertion negatived or repudiated the existence of the tortious act on which alone the plaintiff's right of
recovery rested, the so-called rule of election of remedies was
unknown.
The history of the rule is a matter for speculation. It has always been assumed to be of very ancient origin. Even at the earliest common law there were concurrent remedies and the litigant
might take his choice. Says Coke: "If a man has several remedies
for the same thing, he has an election to use which he pleases......
In Folsom v. Carli, ' Judge Flandrau said:
"While the forms of action were in existence a party had
what was called the right of election of actions. This right in the
hands of a skilful pleader could be used to great advantage. There
were many cases in which a plaintiff could declare in trespass,
trover, or case according to the facts, or he might elect to waive
the tort and declare in assumpsit. So in general a plaintiff could
elect to declare either in assumpsit or debt. One of the most
usual reasons in practice for adopting a form of action ex delicto,
instead of declaring in assumpsit, was to. cut. off an apprehended
off-set, which could be interposed to the latter but not to the former."
In a later case," where plaintiff brought a common law action
for damages from injuries sustained in the hold of the vessel, the
court enumerated the remedies as follows:
"By virtue of the saving clause [in the Judicial Act of 1789]
a party so aggrieved may (1) proceed in rem in admiralty if a
maritime lien arises; (2) bring suit in personam in an admiralty jurisdiction; (3) resort to his remedy at law in a state court,
or (4) in the United States court at law, if there are parties proper to give such jurisdiction."
Election of forum is often quite as important as election of form
of action. But no statement of the finality of such an election
can be found until most recent times. The first outspoken case
in England was Smith v. Baker,' decided in 1873, in which it
was said:
"But if an action for money had and received is so brought,
that is in point of law a conclusive election to waive the tort; and
"'Co. Lit. 145a, cited in 3 Comyns' Dig., Title Election.
: (1861) 6 M1inn. 420 (426).
'Lindstrom v. Mutual S. S. Co, (1916) 132 .Minn. 328, i56 N. W.
669;. (1873) L. R.
8 C. P. 350.
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so the commencement of an action of trespass or trover is a conclusive election of the other way."
Mr. Hine has shown that all the dicta in the earlier cases refer
to a choice between real and personal actions, and that the early
authors found no inconsistency in actions "merely personal."''
Thus in an early case' it was said that,
"Cases have been cited to show that where there are two different kinds of remedies, real and personal, or otherwise" specifically distinguished, a man's election of one prevents him from
using the other. He may distrain or bring assise; but not both, Litt.
S. 588. May bring writ of annuity or distrein, S.219, and his
election is determined even though he should not recover after he
hath counted thereon. Co. Litt. 145, but where both remedies are
merely real or merely personal then the election is not determined
until the judgment on the merits."
This curious distinction between specific writs is well illustrated by the history of trespass and replevin. They were, Dean
Ames says,
"Fundamentally distinct and usually exclusive actions. The
one was brought against a disseisor; the other against the cus-todian. The former was a personal action, the latter a real action.
Trespass presupposed the property in the defendant, whereas replevin assumed the property in the plaintiff, at the time of action
brought."
To which Dean Ames adds in a note:
"Accordingly, even after replevin became concurrent with trespass, if a plaintiff had both writs pending at once for the same
goods, the second writ was abated for the 'contrairiositie' of the
supposal of the writs."'
The Minnesota court, assuming that the rule of election of
remedies was fully accepted in its decisions, recognized its anomalous character. The court has been at pains to point out that
the rule must be one sui generis, and cannot be assimilated to the
accepted doctrines of equitable jurisprudence. Thus in Pederson
v. Christofferson'' the court said:
"The doctrine of election of remedies differs from that of estop26 H. L. R. 716.
'Hitchin v. Campbell, (1771) 2 W. B1. 827. Acc., "But where an
Election is of several Remedies, if he chooses one, he may afterwards have
the other in personal Cases; as, where he has Election of several Actions."
3 Comyns' Dig., Title Election, Co. Lit. 145a. And Chitty says: "The
circumstances.-of a party having elected one of several remedies by action will not in general preclude him from abandoning such suit and after
duly discontinuing it,
he may adopt any other remedy" (Pleading 234).
":Ames, Disseisin of Chattels. 3 H. L. R. 23 (31). Lectures Legal
History-I72 (182).
'(i9o6) 97 Minn. 491, io6 N. W. 958.
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pel in its broadest sense in that the party invoking it need not
show that he will suffer some material disadvantage unless his
adversary be required to abide by his election."
Other courts and writers have been less keen in scenting the real
basis of the rule. It is often mistaken for a special application
of the principle of estoppel in pais on the ground that by the misrepresentation of the party electing the other suitor has been misled to his damage.'
In this way the whole distinctiveness and
vitality of the rule is entirely disregarded and lost. If really only
a branch of estoppel, the cases decided upon it are unsupportable.
If fully recognized, on the contrary, the rule goes far beyond
estoppel, including cases where there has been no misrepresentation, where the other party has been in no way misled-in other
words, where the familiar requisites of an estoppel in pais are
most prominently absent.
Nor is election a matter of waiver, as is often assumed.
"Waiver," as the term is commonly used by the courts involves
a voluntary act of relinquishment of a right or privilege.'
Now
if A steals B's horse, B finds that he has a right of action for the
wrong committed enforceable in two different ways. He may
bring action in trover for the conversion, or in indebitatus assumpsit for the value. B does not as a matter of fact voluntarily relinquish the right to sue in one action by adopting the other. What
really happens is that the law beforehand determines for B that
he may have his choice between them, but that he cannot in any.
case exhaust one and then take up the other. "When to elect
there is but one, 'tis Hobson's choice; take that or none." This is
the simplest statement of the rule. It does not involve either a
voluntary act or a real relinquishment: it is the inference of the
law from the exercise of the right. "B had a right of election
between two positions, and he chose one. He did not 'waive' or
T

321Ig

Yale L. J. 221 (239); Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, (895)

82 Md.

50, 33 At]. 491, 31 L. R. A. 789.

""Does anybody know what waiver is? I do not Some years ago I
commenced a book upon waiver, wrote several hundred pages, and then
observed that what I had done was to put all the waiver cases I had come
across into four other departments of the law. I resolved to go no
further with my book on waiver until I had found a specimen, of the supposed genus. I have never yet seen one, and cannot imagine what it will
be like if it ever be discovered. . . . If it has a religious aspect, I bow
respectfully and cease my demands for definition; but if it be really bilateral, I believe that every supposed sample can be put in one of four well
known and perfectly respectable categories: Release, Contract, Estoppel
or Election." 12 Col. L. R. 61g (Evart). See Dawson v. Shillock, (1882)
29 Minn. i89, 12 N. W.

526.
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relinquish the other. He never had it. He had a choice, and he
did not waive that. He exercised it.""'
This discussion points out the penal operation of the rule.
It is not invoked for the protection of the defendant against an
unjustifiable injury as an estoppel is. It is not the result of an
intentional abandonment, like a waiver. On the ontrar , it imposes a special limitation on the plaintiff by restricting his means
of redress for an admitted wrong, and allows the defendant a
gratuitous advantage in case of its infraction. It inferentially
operates in terrorem by imposing a duty on the plaintiff to choose
his remedy well through requiring him to choose it irrevocably.
Its real basis is .the notion of inconsistency between certain
writs. B "waives" the tort by declaring in assumpsit only in this
loose sense: that he has alternative actions and therefore by accepting one he discards the others.
"It is customary to say, that where goods are tortiously taken
and sold the owner may 'waive' the tort and sustain an action in
assumpsit for money had and received; but nobody would think
of saying that the owner might 'waive' his action in assumpsit
and bring an action in trespass. ' The owner has a right to elect;
he makes his election; he gives up-he 'waives' nothing.."'
Thus the rule that the elector's choice must be irrevocable
does not follow so simply as has been supposed: it results from
the additional fact that the law says that the interpretation of the
facts in each case is on an inconsistent theory. For in form by
suing in assumpsit plaintiff asserts that property is no longer in
himself but has passed to the defendant by a sale, and that he is
suing for the purchase price. And the fiction of a sale is expanded into a reality of substance, so that the case appears to be one
for the application of the general principle of election. In other
words, the law stamps the remedial alternatives with the consequences of an affirmance or disaffirmance of a sale. Therefore,
after suing in assumpsit and failing to recover, the plaintiff cannot resort to an action in trover according to this mysterious
dogma of "inconsistency"-a description of the prohibition the
law has laid upon him against being able to try his hand it various
plays.'"
."Ewart, Waiver

138.

'But the court said just this in Smith v.Baker, (1873) L. R. 8 C. P.
350.
"Ewart, Waiver 7-8.
"Peters v. Bain. (i89o) 133 U. S. 67o, ioS. C. R. 364, 33 L. Ed. 696.
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In the most recent case before the Court of Appeal in England,' the statements of the judges as to the basis of the doctrine
were hardly more critical. Although the case was really one of
ratification, it was treated by Scrutton L. J. as an election of remedies. He said apologetically:
"It is not easy to see why this act of the owners should enure to
benefit of the agents, who were not parties to the action for goods
sold and delivered, and who have in noway altered their position
in consequence of any election involved in bringing that action,
but the principle is well established."
To support the profundity of the rule he referred to the wellknown couplet:
"Thoughts too deep for tears subdue the court
When I'assumpsit bring, and god-like waive a tort .....
Bankes introduced his argument by saying: "This is an attempt
to blow hot and cold as Lord Esher used to say, or to approbate
and reprobate in the language of others."
Now it must be plain that the plaintiff in "waiving" a conversion never in fact regards the transaction as a sale. It is true
that after judgment in trover, by the early law," and after judgment and satisfaction at the present time,"3 property in chattels.
passes to the defendant. But this is merely by operation of law.
For one need only consider the possibility of the wrongdoer suing
for breach of warranty of the chattels after suit against him in
assumpsit and dismissal thereof, to appreciate that the sale is entirely fictitious. Concrete support for this belief may be found
in the decision that a sheriff cannot have assumpsit, though he
may have trover for conversion of goods in his custody."'
Thus we are returned ultimately to -the original thesis of the
substantive law that one cannot affirm and disaffirm the same
transaction, and the doctrine of equity that one cannot claim inconsistent titles, and marvel at its translation into the field of adjective law. This is a classical statement of its significance:
"Allegans contraria non est audiendus. In translation of this
maxim of the law Lord Kenyon said that a man shall not be per"'Verschures Creameries Ld., v. Hull & Netherlands S. S. Co. Ld.
[19211 2 K. B. 6o8.
'The Circuiteers, an Eclogue, by J. L. Adolphus, i Law Quar. Rev. 232.
...Buckland v. Johnson, (1854) 15 C. B. 145.
'28 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 738; Elliott v. Hayden, (1870) 104
Mass. i8o; Lovejoy v. Murray, (1865) 3 Wall. (U.S.) i.
'Westervelt v. Jacquelin, (1835) Anth. (N.Y.) 2nd Ed., 320. See
Moffat v. Wood, Seld. Notes (N.Y.) i86, that consignor cannot waive
tort in case of conversion of chattels by consignee, who is factor for con-

signor.
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mitted to blow hot and cold with reference to the same transaction,
or insist at different times on the truth of each of two conflicting
allegations, according to the prompting of his private interests.
Broom, Leg. Max. 168."'"
Assuming the validity of the prohibition, the application at
common law when the forms of action were carefully distinguished, and special pleading was an art, was clear. There was little
possibility of mistaking an action in contract for one in tort. But
with the institution of code pleading,"' and the introduction of one
civil action in place of all the common law forms of action, it
might have been expected thati along with the general merger of
the separate actions the rule would be lost.
"IA the case supposed, however, the implied promise is a fiction, and yet. to allow it is well enough in a system abounding in
fictions. It is not, however, in harmony with one from which
fictitious averments are supposed to be excluded. Yet I do not
find that the attention of the courts, in the states that have adopted the new system, has been called to the seeming inconsistency.
The common law doctrine is still realized; the old phraseology,
in the old sense, is still used by the courts; and I shall be compelled to treat the subject, in this regard, according to the view
taken under the common law procedure."'
From the earlier cases, there has been insinuated into the
science of code pleading the notion that the plaintiff must adopt
a particular theory of his case, corresponding at least to the general common law distinction between delictual and contractual
actions, and between actions at law and suits in equity, and must
recover on the theory of action adopted.
How far the courts have thus defeated the purpose, of the code
makers to abolish the forms of action may be illustrated by a recent case in Minnesota."' A sold an ironer, on a contract of conditional sale reserving title, to B who conducted a restaurant.
Before final payment A wrongfully removed the ironer for alleged default. B sued to recover damages for the wrongful taking. The trial court directed a verdict for A; B appealed. The
court affirmed the direction. It was conceded that trover would
"*Kaehler v. Dobberpuhl, (1884) 6o Wis. 256 (261), i8N. W. 841.
'"In 185i in Minnesota. See 6 Minn. 425.
"'Bliss, Code Pleading 2nd Ed. sec. 12. But see Downs v. Finnegan,
(1894) 58 Minn. 112, 59 N. W. 98i: "The right to waive the tort and to recover as on implied assumpsit is an exception to the principles of code
pleading, and there must be no extension beyond what is allowed at common law."
'.Reinkey v.Findley Electric Co., (1920) 147 M1inn., i61, i8o N. W. 236.
See. however, Tuder v. Short Line, etc, Co., (1915) 131 Minn. 317, 155
N. W. 2m.
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lie for the wrongful retaking of the property, and that in such
action full money compensation could be recovered for actual
damages, including humiliation. But in this case the complaint
did not allege damages for a conversion. Therefore the action
was to be regarded as one for breach of contract. And in such
action no recovery for injured feelings may be had in Minnesota.
The net result was that the action was taken as sounding in contract, because the prayer for relief seemed to indicate that plaintiff had adopted such a theory, and therefore an allegation of
damages sufficient in any action for a conversion, was rendered
wholly nugatory. Two judges dissented; they were willing to
break through this vicious circle by simply finding that since there
were facts sufficient for a conversion, and facts sufficient to
show substantial damages, the mere form of the prayer for relief
could not destroy the sufficiency of the complaint.
In a similar case, Ash v. Childs Dining Hally the Massachusetts court reversed a judgment for personal injury suffered
from swallowing a tack in a piece. of pie served by defendant.
The sole ground of reversal was that the complaint after setting
out the facts in full, contained a further allegation that "unmindful of its duty the defendant, by its servants and agents, carelessly and negligently permitted said nail to get into such pie."
On the trial no evidence of negligence had been offered. Therefore, the court said, this allegation, superfluous to the plaintiff's"
rights, transformed a perfect -contract action for breach of implied warranty into a tort action unsupportable for failure of
proof. ' "
And so, although the whole genius of code pleading would
seem to oppose the retention of a rule founded in outworn formulae, and granting unearned advantage, rather than a merited
protection, we find the curious rule perpetuated in many decisions under the various codes.
In the famous case of Terry v. Munger?" it was held that a
judgment obtained in assumpsit against one of two joint tortfeasors, though unsatisfied, would bar suit in trover against the
other tort-feasor for a wrongful conversion of the property. In
a criticism of the case Professor Keener wrote:
'"(1918) 231 Mass. 86, i2o N. E. 396.
"'For criticism see 33 H. L. R. z4o, (Scott A. W., Progress of Law,
Civil Procedure).

(x89o)
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"Now everyone knows that where one man tortiously takes
the goods of another, there is no sale between those parties; and
yet the highest court in the state of New York gravely asserts
that there was. In other words a fiction to which it is no longer
necessary in New York in order to give a remedy is there resorted to to deny a right: and the court says that there is no tort
where but for the proof of a tort there could have been no recovery against anyone. The decision will probably never be cited
as illustrating the maxim, in fictione juris subsistit equitas.' ' 3
The supreme court of Tennessee in a similiar case refused to
adopt the reasoning accepted in Terry v. Munger, and held that
the action in contract could not waive the tort, since the tort was
the very foundation of the action.'"
The courts have rather diffidently connected the rule with
considerations of public policy. Most attractively stated, its justification thins down to the disciplinary policy that litigants shall
not experiment with the remedies afforded by the law, bolstered
up by the related argument that relaxation of the rule would impose a great and useless burden on the courts by the recklessness
of suitors.'
Its real motive may more probably be found in the regrettable conception of the early common-law lawyers that a litigation is a sporting game between the parties, and that the favors
should go to the most skillful player even though sometimes he
-may have the less deserving case."'
As to the alleged public policy underlying the rule, a critic of
the rule, which he thinks is spurious, says:"
"If the policy to prevent trifling with justice, forbids a suitor
who has two remedies to dismiss a suit for one and resort to the
'Keener Quasi-Contracts 212.

"'Huffman v. Hughlett, (1883) ii Lea (Tenn.) 549; Kirkman v.
Phillips Heirs, (871) 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 222. Acc., -Cohen v. Goldman,
(x878) 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 436. Cf. Edwards, Trustee v. Schillinger Bros.
Co., (1910) 153 Ill. App. 219, (223).
"Peters v. Bain, (189o) 133 U. S. 67o, 1o S.C. R. 354, 33 L. Ed. 696.
' 4 "What Dean Wigmore has called the sporting theory of justice, the
idea that judicial administration of justice is a game to be played to the
bitter end, no doubt has its roots in Anglo-American character and is
closely connected with the individualism of the common law. Yet it was
fostered by the frontier attitude towards litigation and it has flourished
chiefly in recent times in tribunals such as the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, where the memory of the frontier is still green." Pound, The
Spirit of the Comnon Law, 127. "Something of this spirit, which is the
spirit of the strict law, may be recognized today in such doctrines as contributory negligence and assumption of risk and the exaggerations of contentious procedure which treats litigation as a game." Ibid, 146.
.'Hine, Election of Remedies, a Criticism, 26 H. L. R. 707 (711).
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other, notwithstanding the fact that no action has been taken by
other persons in reliance on the suit first commenced, the same
public policy should require a suitor who has one remedy, and who
commences an action therefor, to prosecute that action to a conclusion or be forever barred; yet the law permits one to dismiss
an action without prejudice and recommence a similar action.
"Furthermore the rule as to election of remedies does not apply unless the plaintiff actually has two inconsistent remedies ;,
but if we assume the principle underlying the rule to be that the
time of the courts shall not be taken up with different suits against
the same defendant based on the same state of facts, the plaintiff
should be required in all cases to elect at his peril between inconsistent theories. It cannot be denied that a defendant suffers
more by being compelled to defend successive suits prosecuted
to final judgment .bya plaintiff who in fact has but one available
remedy, than he does by being sued twice by a plaintiff who had
two available remedies but who abandoned one suit immediately
after its commencement. More time of the courts, also, is wasted
by the first suitor than by the second."
Conclusion. We have found that the rule of election of remedies has always been confined to two infrequent instances, and that
fortunately the Minnesota supreme court is not committed by express decision to its acceptance. It is true that the court has often said, in the identical language of Coke,' 1 that a person who
has a choice of remedies may elect his remedy. This, however,
goes no further than to allow a litigant, whose cause of action is
enforceable through several remedies, whether cumulative or alternative, whether given by the common law or by statute, or by
both, to adopt whichever remedy he wishes.' 2 It in no way implies that after choice of one, the others are not also available
Such an implication depends always on the deeper assumption thai
they" proceed "from opposite and irreconcilable claims of right,'
which we have seen applies properly only to the substantive law.
'zClark v. Heath, (i9o6) ioi Me. 53o, 64 AtI. 913; Barnsdal v. Waltemeyer, (igo5) 142 Fed. 415.
"Co. Lit. I45a, cited in 3 Comyns' Digest, Title Election.
'Bitzer v. Bobo, (1888) 39 Minn. 18, 38 N. W. 6og. That the court
cannot elect for the plaintiff against his wishes, see Cisewski v. Cisewski,
(1915) 129 Minn. 284, 152 N. W. 642. Plaintiff sued to recover the trust
res in its substituted form, but the trial court denied such relief and gave
only a money judgment secured by lien. On appeal reversed. "It would
seem fairly clear that plaintiff had the absolute right to choose his own
remedy and that having elected to claim the property in its substituted
form, the court was without power to deny him his relief and compel him
to take a remedy that he did not elect. We know of no authority or principle that gives the court the right of election between remedies that belongs to a party especially when there has been a plain election by the
party."
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The court is not bound to such an assumption. The court in
Gregory v. Cale, ' was merely repeating the unimpeachable language of Coke. Defendant appealed from an order of execution
authorizing levy for plaintiff on specified real estate, which had
.been exempt from bankruptcy proceedings under the state Homestead Law, but was still liable for debts contracted prior to the
passage of the Homestead Law. The court said:
"The creditor has an election of remedies in situations likg
that here presented-that is, where property [which] is exempt
from general debts, but liable for particular obligations, for instance, the purchase price, wc'rk, labor, and material furnished in
its construction and repair; and he may proceed (1) in equity,
setting forth in his complaint all the facts, and demand a lien upon
the particular property; (2) he may proceed by attachment; or
(3) by an ordinary action for the recovery of money. The same
result follows either remedy, namely, the appropriation of the
property charged with the payment of the debt. And it would
seem in this state, where all forms and distinctions between law
and equity are abolished, to be immaterial which method is pursued."
This right of choice was expressly recognized in case of conversion. In Downs v. Finnegan, the defendant was allowed to
"waive the tort" and present a claim in contract, in order to come
within the counterclaim statute. Plaintiff had removed stone
quarried on defendant's land, and had sold or used it beneficially.
The court said:
"That in cases where property has been severed from real estate by a wrongdoer, carried from the freehold, and converted
to his own use, the rightful owner may sue and recover its value
as on implied contract,, is thoroughly established, although it may
not be in harmony with the principles of the reformed system of
pleading. .

.

. It being established that an injured party may

[so] elect between the two forms of remedial proceedings-may
sue in tort for the wrong done him, or in assumpsit as upon an
implied contract,--it follows that by waiving the tort the demand
may be counterclaimed against the plaintiff's cause of action arising on another contract ..

There is not even a dictum as to the rule of election. Of
course, there are numerous dicta in other cases as to its conclusive effect. But the foregoing case is the only one in the reported decisions that even raised a genuine problem of so-called
"inconsistent remedies" for the application of the rule. In fact,
(9i1) 115 Minn. 5o8, 133 N. W. 75.
' 0(894) 58 Minn. 112, 59 N. W. 981.

1

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

by their inapplicability to the situations 'at hand, these dicta disclose that the most lamentable influence of the rule lies not in the
failure of relief in the few genuine cases of election of remedies,
but in the general confusion of the problem of substantive election. Instead of finding the solution for problems of affirmance
and disaffirmance of contracts, ratification and repudiation, etc.,
in sound, basic principles of law, the courts have been far too
ready to snatch at ill considered maxims, hallowed only by the
obscurity of their origin, and spin the most profound implications out of them. Judges are few, who in ascertaining the rights
of defrauded parties in transactions do not gravely begin with
a sounding statement of the rule of election of remedies, and attempt to use it as the basis for judgment. The glory of destroying the rule would reside not in the fact that the infrequent suitor
who pursues his cotenant for taking an excessive share of the
profits might have more perfect justice, but in the fact that the
law would be purged by the exorcism of the mediaeval spirit of
formalism from which the rule of election of remedies springs.
A clean analysis and differentiation of the types of election would
allow an independent and rational decision as to the necessity and
consequences of each. It would dissipate the naive assumption
that "The same effect that follows the adoption of one of several remedies, to wit, exclusion from resort to the other, follows
the adoption of an alternative provision in a contract, or the acceptance of a benefit under a will or other instrument of donation."
It would confine to its proper and just sphere the now
all too ubiquitous dogma that:
"The decision made
Can never be recalled. The gods implore not,
Plead not, solicit not; they only offer
Choice and occasion, which once being passed
Return no more.'
'7 Encyc. P1. & Pr. 36r.

'"Longfellow, Masque of Pandora, Tower of Prometheus on Mount

Caucasus.

